[freenet-dev] Vulnerability in inserting the manifest before finishing

[Matthew Toseland]

On Friday 04 January 2008 19:57, Michael Rogers wrote:
> Matthew Toseland wrote:
> > Right, even if each node has the same number of exit nodes. And then 
you've 
> > got the effects of nodes going down or going up on the set of exit nodes 
for 
> > each node. You need to have a lot of inertia here, or that'll give away a 
lot 
> > of information. Hence my coming up with the idea of cells. The question 
is, 
> > is it workable?
> 
> If the members of a cell can somehow agree on its membership then I
> don't think it's a problem if exit nodes come and go (except in the
> general sense that if a node's ever offline when your pseudonym is
> active then that node can be removed from your anonymity set). But what
> happens if a cell is split due to nodes being offline?

Above I was talking about without cells.

But this is why it is important for a cell to be well-connected!

Having said that, is going through untrusted nodes as gateways from one 
trusted node to another a problem? As long as we can choose two cell members 
to go through, we should be okay?
> 
> How can the members of a cell agree on its membership without including
> Sybil nodes?
> 
> Start by finding a clique of n nodes (n-1 of your neighbours are all
> connected to each other). Recursively add every node that has at least
> n-1 neighbours in the cell. (Smaller values of n will result in more and
> larger cells.)
> 
> Does the result depend on the order in which nodes are considered?

I would have thought so.
> 
> Cheers,
> Michael
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