[freenet-dev] One tunnel per request: justification

[Matthew Toseland]

On Friday 04 January 2008 02:18, Michael Rogers wrote:
> Matthew Toseland wrote:
> > One classic strategy from mixmaster etc is to have a long delay at each 
step. 
> > We could do this for the more sensitive requests. The objective would be 
to 
> > send on the requests (more likely inserts) in groups big enough to likely 
> > contain requests from all the nodes in the cell.
> 
> Yup, you could definitely make timing attacks difficult if you're
> willing to pay the price in latency. Could be useful for things like Frost.

I was thinking of long-term requests in general - large downloads for example.

Do we need to do this on the return journey or only on the outward?
> 
> >> Do you mean every node calculates the trust thresholds from one node's
> >> perspective, or each node calculates them from its own perspective?
> > 
> > How about a node can't join the cell unless its credibility with all or 
most 
> > other members is over some value?
> 
> Sounds promising - but could that result in some nodes not being allowed
> to join any cell?

Yes. If you're a leaf node you can't use premix routing.
> 
> Also, a node on one edge of the cell needs to be able to calculate trust
> scores from the point of view of a node on the opposite edge, so you
> have to spread the topology information twice as far.

True.
> 
> Cheers,
> Michael
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