[freenet-dev] FCP changes for ULPRs

[Michael Rogers]

Matthew Toseland wrote:
> The datastructure implementing this is limited to 10,000 keys 
> on each node (this will take up some RAM).

Hmm, so how much bandwidth does an attacker need to spend sending ULPRs 
for nonexistent keys before subscriptions for real keys start getting 
pushed out of the data structure, breaking up the subscription trees for 
those keys?

The attacker needs to make 10,000 requests per hour to overflow a peer's 
data structure... less than 3 per second. Assuming ULPRs are 1000 bytes 
including overhead, an attacker with a 10 Mbps connection could affect 
450 opennet peers.

"Ultra-lightweight" could actually be a disadvantage here, because if 
the peers can easily handle that number of requests they won't throttle 
the attacker.

Cheers,
Michael