[freenet-dev] Alpha, Darknet routing, et al.

[Robert Hailey]

On Feb 1, 2008, at 11:57 AM, Matthew Toseland wrote:

>> I'm not familiar enough with the details of the proposed ULPRs and  
>> how
>> USKs and Frost and the like check for new updates / messages, but it
>> seems possible that simple legitimate checks for new content would
>> have a similar effect.  Of course, failure tables would help a lot
>> with that case, but they wouldn't help against a malicious attacker.
>
> Could ULPRs help to resolve it? Would it be possible to estimate the  
> demand
> for a key (in a way which doesn't favour single nodes that constantly
> rerequest, and is biased by links so that an attacker could only  
> attack
> proportionately to the number of connections he has), in order to  
> decide
> which requests to let through?

I guess you could add to the failure table which distinct links have  
requested a given key, and be more likely to let those through with  
more links (once the failure is timed out). It doesn't seem very  
granular, as I would suppose (in a small world network) that a re- 
request from a non-peer node would be very likely to show up on a  
different connection.

--
Robert Hailey

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20080201/d8b0ca4d/attachment.htm