[freenet-dev] Short refs was Re: alternative to #freenet-refs

[Matthew Toseland]

On Monday 19 November 2007 22:45, Michael Rogers wrote:
> Matthew Toseland wrote:
> >> True. We could use the hash of the entire ARK key (including the secret
> >> part) to generate the obfuscation key - that way a node handling the ARK
> >> request won't be able to de-obfuscate the handshake.
> > 
> > We could, but this would not help us with short-refs, as we'd have to ship 
> > both the pubkey and the secret decryption key, hence 64 bytes (bad!).
> 
> The shorter the better, no argument there. Here's how I see the
> tradeoff: short refs are 38 bytes and don't have to be kept secret; ARK
> refs are 70 bytes and do have to be kept secret (because of the
> decryption key), but they give us the ability to retrieve the ARK via
> Freenet if a direct connection fails. In theory we could have both; in
> practice I doubt most users will understand the difference. Personally I
> think short refs are the way to go, but it's your call.

Well, 70 bytes is around the length of an SSK. So maybe it's still useful.

I don't think we should leave it to the users to decide, at least not in 
simple mode.
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