<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1"
http-equiv="Content-Type">
<title></title>
</head>
<body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000">
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----<br>
Hash: SHA1<br>
<br>
Lars Juel Nielsen wrote:<br>
<span style="white-space: pre;">> On 5/19/06, Helge Preuss
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:scout@hyperspace-travel.de"><scout@hyperspace-travel.de></a> wrote: I just<br>
> listened to the lecture about the new freenet version Ian Clarke<br>
> and Oskar Sandberg gave at the 22C3 (the CCC has released it: <br>
>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://media.ccc.de/filez/congress/2005/lectures/audio/vorbis/22C3-492-en-freenet_new_version.ogg">http://media.ccc.de/filez/congress/2005/lectures/audio/vorbis/22C3-492-en-freenet_new_version.ogg</a>).<br>
> It left open some questions for me.<br>
> <br>
> I do not read the freenet mailing list regularly, so I apologize
if<br>
> these questions have been asked before, but an explanation would<br>
> be nice anyway.<br>
> <br>
> Ian and Oskar explained the routing model of freenet 0.7 and the
<br>
> issues it aims to address. If I understood correctly, the point
is<br>
> to connect only to trusted peers to ensure that no hostile nodes<br>
> discover you are running freenet (and possibly compromise the<br>
> connection). The reasoning behind this is that in repressive<br>
> regimes running freenet (and thereby communicating that you have<br>
> something to hide) may be enough in itself to get you into
trouble.<br>
> <br>
> <br>
> While I agree with the premise, I have two issues with this.<br>
> <br>
> One, can't everybody discover you run freenet by doing a portscan<br>
> on your computer? I assume that would be a more efficient way to
<br>
> mass-detect freenet nodes than smuggling hostile nodes into
freenet<br>
> - especially if you're a government agency with broad resources.<br>
> <br>
> Two, they mentioned that a major aim is to get many people to
run <br>
> freenet. That is obvious. But how would you achieve this goal if
<br>
> people are forced to *personally know* other people connected to<br>
> the network? What do I do if I'm, say, a dissident with no
special <br>
> knowledge of computers and no hacker friends either? Do I just
give<br>
> up and sit on my single freenet node? Or do I turn to a
centralized<br>
> service, thus rendering the web of trust obsolete?<br>
> <br>
> Maybe (probably) I misunderstood something. But I don't see how
the<br>
> two goals - trusted connections and wide coverage - go together.<br>
> And given that you can be detected with a portscan anyway, isn't
it<br>
> practical just to forget about the web of trust and maximize<br>
> coverage instead?<br>
> <br>
> Regards<br>
> <br>
> Helge<br>
>>> <br>
> _______________________________________________ chat mailing
list <br>
> <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:chat@freenetproject.org">chat@freenetproject.org</a> Archived:<br>
> <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general">http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general</a> Unsubscribe
at <br>
> <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat">http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat</a> Or<br>
> <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:chat-request@freenetproject.org?subject=unsubscribe">mailto:chat-request@freenetproject.org?subject=unsubscribe</a><br>
>>> <br>
> <br>
>> You're somewhat right about the trouble of getting connected,<br>
>> while the net is small it'll be hard but as it grow chances
are<br>
>> better that you know someone who also use it.</span><br>
Ah, but that's a fundamental problem: As long as you're small, it's<br>
hard to grow. If you're large, growing is easier (until you reach a<br>
saturation point, I guess).<br>
Still, even if freenet grows, there will be many people who don't know<br>
anyone with access to it (there are still many people around without a<br>
GMail invite, too. And I dare to predict that freenet never will<br>
achieve Google's market penetration).<br>
At least, there should be some central servers to get newbies started.<br>
<span style="white-space: pre;">> <br>
>> About port scanning you're wrong, freenet use random ports.<br>
> <br>
>> And it is planned that it will be possible to use
stegonography<br>
>> later so the trafic would look like a game, VoIP or video<br>
>> streaming so it'd be harder to automatically block it.</span><br>
freenet may use random ports, but there still is a protocol behind it<br>
which can be detected.<br>
Using steganography is a nice idea and I'm sure it can protect against<br>
traffic analysis, but I don't see how it can protect against a<br>
connection request. Will freenet only accept connections from trusted<br>
IPs? But then, what about dynamically assigned IPs?<br>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----<br>
Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (GNU/Linux)<br>
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://enigmail.mozdev.org">http://enigmail.mozdev.org</a><br>
<br>
iD8DBQFEbiaNMfG7Vu9K+FQRAvwbAKCyDKJlxOx8rU+FuUZeBOejhD+wNACg1sZT<br>
mHbGmWREQ8Tzykte2CHsUhw=<br>
=UMCA<br>
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----<br>
<br>
</body>
</html>